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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
DANIEL J. PHELPS,
Appellee and
Cross Appellant,
Case No. 970575-CA
vs.
JEAN SMITH SANDERS TRUST,
Appellant and
Cross Appellee.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
AND CROSS APPELLANT
JURISDICTION
This Court's jurisdiction, in this matter, is based on U.C.A. §78-2A-3(2)(j), providing
appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals for cases transferred from the Supreme Court.
RELEVANT STATUTES
25-5-3. Leases and Contracts or Interest in Lands. Every contract for the leasing for a longer
period than one year, or for sale, of any lands, or any interest in lands, shall be void unless the
contract, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by whom the
lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized in writing.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
This appeal was taken by appellant from a ruling on joint Motions for Summary Judgment,
filed by Plaintiff and Defendant in the Second Judicial District Court. The material facts are not in
dispute. The statement of FactsfromJudge Memmott are set forth and adopted by Appellee.
1. Plaintiff Daniel J. Phelps ("plaintiff') approached L.D. Sanders ("Mr. Sanders"), the nowdeceased husband of defendant Jean Smith Sanders, Trustee of the Sanders Family Protective Trust
("defendant"), with his desire to purchase an unimproved parcel of property owned by the trust.
(This is referred to by the parties and hereinafter by the Court as "parcel 5").
2. Plaintiff owns property adjacent to and east of parcel 5, on which is located commercial
establishments, and parcel 5 was desired by plaintiff in order to provide needed additional parking for
those commercial establishments.
3. Mr. Sanders expressed to plaintiff that he would be willing to sell parcel 5, but only on the
condition that plaintiff also purchase, simultaneously, parcel 4, which was adjacent to and west of
parcel 5.
4. Parcel 4 was owned by defendant's daughter and son-in-law, and was improved with a
home. Defendant had lived in the home for a period of several years some years prior to the time of
the offer to buy, but at the time of the offer, the home was occupied by tenants as a rental property.
5. Although plaintiff had no desire or need to acquire parcel 4, plaintiff determined that he
would be willing to purchase parcel 4 in addition to parcel 5, if that was the only way that the deal
for parcel 5 could be accomplished.
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6. Pursuant to the discussions between the parties, plaintiff prepared and executed two real
estate purchase contracts ("contracts"), one for parcel 5 and one for parcel 4. The contracted
purchase price for parcel 5 was $70,000, and the corresponding price for parcel 4 was $170,000.
7. Both contracts contained the provision:
24. OFFER AND TIME FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to purchase the Property on
the above terms and conditions. If Seller does not accept this offer by 6:00 6:00
AM
X PM Mountain Time 6-23 1995, this offer shall lapse; and the Brokerage shall return the
Earnest Money Deposit to Buyer.
8. By agreement of the parties, there was in fact no earnest money paid pursuant to either of
the contracts, and also by agreement of the parties, and also pursuant to the contracts, the funds for
the purchase of the two parcels were to comefromnew loans.
9. It was not until June 26, 1995 that the parties were finally able to meet to sign the
contracts, therefore, pursuant to the terms of the contracts, plaintiffs offer had lapsed.
10. At the meeting defendant expressed her feeling that she did not wish to sell the property,
but after consulting with Mr. Sanders and his expressing his feeling that she should sign the contract,
she signed the contract, indicating her assent to its terms by placing her signature in the area of the
contract labeled Acceptance/Rejection/Counteroffer, the box labeled "Acceptance" having been
checked.
11. Defendant admits that at that meeting she signed and initialled the contract for parcel 5,
and that the meeting and signing took place June 26, 1995. Defendant's son's and daughter-in-law's
signature and initials also appear on the contract for parcel 4, also signed June 26, 1995.
12. At the meeting, no party expressed any concern or question that the contract they were
signing was not valid or legally binding for any reason. (Plaintiff has never denied or failed to perform
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his obligations under the contract i.e.: Plaintiff has always considered himself bound to the terms of
the contract).
13. Defendant admits that she understood at the time she signed the contract that such a
signing indicates one's agreement to the terms of a contract.
14. Defendant admits that it was her assumption that after the contract for parcel 5 had been
signed that plaintiff understood that he had purchased the parcel.
15. The closing on parcel 5 was originally scheduled for August 22, 1995, but Mr. Sanders
passed away on July 30,1995. This death, along with the almost simultaneous death of defendant's
sister, caused defendant to feel that she was not able to deal with anything.
16. Because of the circumstances, the parties agreed that the closing would be postponed
until some time after a period of mourning passed.
17. After August 22, plaintiff attempted to reschedule the closing, but each rescheduled
closing was postponed.
18. Defendant now refuses to close on the purchase of parcel 5.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The lower court's ruling granting judgment to plaintiff is supported by the records and facts
of the case. There was a "meeting of the minds" on June 26, 1995, as admitted by Defendant and
found by the court. A legally binding and enforceable contract was formed. Appellant's change of
heart does not prevent the court from enforcing the terms of the contract. All formalities of the
contract have been fully complied with and the court's ruling should be affirmed. Attorney fees
should be awarded to Plaintiff as the prevailing party under the Real Estate Contract.
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ARGUMENT
The issue on appeal, as articulated by Appellant is whether the lower court erred in finding
the parties had entered into a binding, enforceable contract for the sale of real property. The standard
of review applied by the court in cases involving questions of contract interpretation not requiring
a resort to extrinsic evidence are matters of law, and on such questions the reviewing court shall
accord the trial court's interpretation no presumption of correctness. Zions First Nat'l Bank. N. A.
v. National Am. Title Ins. Co.. 749 P.2d 651, 653 (Utah 1988); Sackler v. Savin. 897 P.2d 1217,
1220 (Utah 1995). The Court of Appeals will affirm a trial court's grant of summary judgment when
there is no genuine issue of fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
I
THE PARTIES ENTERED INTO A LEGALLY ENFORCEABLE
CONTRACT IN COMPLIANCE WITH ALL NECESSARY FORMALITIES
A. Counteroffer and Acceptance.
Judge Memmott ruled in favor of Appellee that Appellant's attempted acceptance on June 26,
1995, was a counteroffer that was accepted by Appellee, and that a valid and legally binding contract
was entered into capable of being enforced by the court. (Ruling, Conclusion p. 9). Under the
principles of basic contract law, a contract is formed when there is a meeting of the minds. Sackler
v. Savin 897 P.2d 1217, 1220 (Utah 1995). Further, a contract can be enforced by the courts only
if the obligations of the parties are set forth with sufficient definiteness that it can be performed.
Piston v. Enviropak Med. Products. Inc., 893 P.2d 1071, 1075 (Utah App. 1995). A review of the
Real Estate Purchase Contract at issue in this matter clearly and definitely establishes the obligations
of the parties. Therefore, the only issue to be decided by this Court is whether a binding acceptance
has taken place. The lower court's ruling found that "Defendant admits that she understood at the
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time she signed the contract that such a signing indicate one's agreement to the terms of a contract",
(Statement of Facts, No. 13) and "Defendant admits that it was her assumption that after the contract
for parcel 5 had been signed that Plaintiff had understood that he had purchased the parcel."
(Statement of Facts, No. 14). In Morrison v. Raven Investment, Inc.. 624 P.2d 11 (Nev. 1981), a
Nevada Supreme Court case relied upon by Judge Memmott, the court ruled that an acceptance of
a counteroffer may be shown by subsequent events. The facts would need to show a meeting of the
minds had taken place. The subsequent events in our case show that the parties both understood a
contract was formed, scheduled a closing and raised no objection or defenses to the contract. The
facts in this case support the lower court's ruling that the original offer had lapsed by its express
terms and Appellant's attempted acceptance was a counteroffer, then accepted by Buyer's initialing
of the contract, and as further evidenced by subsequent actions of the parties. Plaintiff has always
considered himself bound to the terms of contract, as evidenced by his signature of acceptance and
his initialing of each page after Defendant's signature of acceptance. Defendant's arguments that
Plaintiff is not legally bound are simply inappropriate since the obligation of Plaintiff to perform has
not been and is not now an issue in this case. To address Defendant's arguments, the Plaintiff would
simply be required to now sign the contract. However, Plaintiff has never denied his obligations or
commitments via the contract.1
B. Renewed Offer.
A grant of summary judgment may be affirmed on any ground, even one not relied on by the
trial court. K&T. Inc. v. Koroulis. 888 P.2d 623,628 (Utah 1994). Alternately, the facts would also
x

While no Utah case was found directly on the issue of mutuality of contract, in Lusco v.
Tavitian, 296 S.W.2d 14, 17 (Missouri 1956) the court held that mutuality is supplied when a
party files a complaint or legal cause of action for specific performance.
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support a finding that the original offer of Buyer even though lapsed had been "renewed." While
Appellee acknowledges that a "rejection terminates an offer so that it cannot afterward be accepted
by the offeree without the renewed consent of the offeror." (17 C.J.S. Contracts Section 51, p. 713),
it is absolutely clear that in this case a renewal of the offer occurred. A renewal of an offer is
established by evidence of the offeror's intent to be bound by the renewed offer. Burton v. Coombs.
557 P.2d 148, 149 (Utah 1976). In the case now before the Court, the agreed statement of facts
indicate that "at a meeting of the parties that took place on June 26, 1995, Defendant expressed her
feeling that she did not wish to sell the property, but after consulting with Mr. Sanders and his
expressing his feeling that she should sign the contract, she signed the contract." (Statement of Facts,
No. 10). "At the meeting, no party expressed any concern or question that the contract they were
signing was not valid or legally binding for any reason." (Statement of Facts, No. 11). Appellant
admits she signed the contract as an acknowledgment of the terms of the contract. (Statement of
Facts, No. 13). The renewal of the offer is clearly established by the undisputed facts. Further, all
the necessary elements in formation of a contract have been satisfied.

II. THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS IS SATISFIED
The majority rule is that the contract must be signed by the party against whom it is sought
to be enforced, but not by the party who seeks to enforce it. Nationwide Resources Corp. v.
Massabnl 658 P.2d 210, 215 (Ariz. App. 1982). The argument of Appellant that no contract was
created because plaintiff did not sign the acceptance is without merit. As noted by Judge Memmott
andU.C.A. Section 25-5-3:
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than on year, or for the sale, of any
lands, or any interest in the lands, shall be void unless the contract, or some note or
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memorandum thereof is in writing subscribed by the party by whom the lease or sale
is to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized in writing.
In the instant case, "the party whom the sale is to be made" is appellant. The majority rule,
as noted above in the Arizona case of Nationwide Resources Corp. v. Massabnl 658 P.2d 210, 215
(Ariz. App. 1982), and consistent with the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Bailey v. Leishman. 89
P.2d 78 (Utah 1907), that the contract must be signed by the party against whom it is sought to be
enforced, but not by the party who seeks to enforce it, is clearly applicable. Appellant's position, as
to the Statute of Frauds, is without merit.
Further, the lower court held that the Statute of Frauds does not apply to an offer and
acceptance, but only to the contract for the sale of land or for an interest in land must be in writing.
Therefore, a enforceable offer and acceptance does not need to be in writing. Defendant admits she
signed the contract intending to be bound and cannot now hide behind that requirements of the
Statute of Frauds to eliminate her objection.
I E ATTORNEY FEES SHOULD HAVE BEEN AWARDED TO THE
PREVAILING PARTY
Paragraph 17 of the Real Estate Purchase contract states:
In any action arising out of this Contract, the prevailing party shall be entitled to costs
and reasonable attorney's fees."
A party is entitled to attorney fees resulting from its principal cause of action for which there is
contractual or statutory obligation. Utah Farm Production Credit Ass'n v. Coy, 627 P.2d 62 (Utah
1981). Furthermore, attorney fees when allowed by law are awarded as a matter of legal right.
Cabrera v. Cottrell. 694 P.2d 622 (Utah 1985). Judge Memmott ruled in favor of Plaintiff but
required each party "to bear their respective costs and attorney fees." As noted, above, attorney fees
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to the prevailing party under a contract are to be awarded as a matter of right. Appellee should be
awarded attorney fees incurred in the trial court action and on the Cross-Appealfiledherein.
CONCLUSION
The undisputed facts support thefindingthat the parties entered into a binding and legally
enforceable contract. Appellant's appeal should be denied and attorney fees awarded for the
underlying action in addition to the Appeal.
Respectfully submitted this ^V day of June, 1998.
DURB ANO LAW FIRM

Stanley L.Ballif
Attorneys for Appellee and Cross
Appellant
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